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We present a rigorous security analysis of continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key
distribution (CV MDI QKD) in a finite-size scenario. The security proof is obtained in two steps: by first assessing
the security against collective Gaussian attacks, and then extending to the most general class of coherent attacks
via the Gaussian de Finetti reduction. Our result combines recent state-of-the-art security proofs for CV QKD with
findings about min-entropy calculus and parameter estimation. In doing so, we improve the finite-size estimate
of the secret key rate. Our conclusions confirm that CV MDI protocols allow for high rates on the metropolitan
scale, and may achieve a nonzero secret key rate against the most general class of coherent attacks after 107–109
quantum signal transmissions, depending on loss and noise, and on the required level of security.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.97.052327
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum communication technologies, and in particular
quantum key distribution (QKD), are rapidly progressing from
research laboratories towards real-world implementations. The
ultimate goal is building a network of quantum devices (quan-
tum internet) enabling unconditionally secure communications
on the global scale [1–4]. To this end, QKD has been recently
extended to a scenario where two honest users (Alice and
Bob) exploit the mediation of an untrusted relay, operated by
the eavesdropper (Eve), to establish a secure communication
channel [5,6]. This remarkable feature is made possible by the
working mechanism of the relay itself, which activates secret
correlations on the users’ remote stations by performing Bell
detection on the incoming signals and publicly announcing
the results [6]. This architecture has been called measurement-
device-independent (MDI) QKD because, as such, the security
of the communication does not rely on the assumption that the
measurement devices (which are more exposed to side-channel
attacks than other devices) are trusted [5,6].
Protocols exploiting quantum continuous variables have
attracted considerable attention for their potential of boosting
the communication rate and for their employability across
midrange (metropolitan) distances [6,7]. The key rates achiev-
able by continuous-variable (CV) QKD protocols are not far
from the ultimate repeaterless bound for private communica-
tion, which, for a lossy line of transmissivity η is − log (1 − η)
bits per use [8]. The security of CV QKD, which is very
well established under Gaussian attacks and in the asymptotic
regime [9], has been recently generalized to the most general
class of coherent attacks as well as to the finite-size setting
[10–14]. In this landscape, the problem of establishing the
secret key rates achievable by CV MDI QKD in the finite-size
setting has not been yet explicitly addressed.
In this paper we fill this gap and provide a rigorous
composable-security proof of the CV MDI QKD protocol
proposed in Ref. [6] (this proof can then be extended to
tripartite [15] and multipartite CV MDI protocols [16]). The
security of CV MDI QKD against collective attacks can be
obtained along the lines of Ref. [10]. Then, the extension to
the most general class of coherent attacks can be obtained
by exploiting the recently introduced Gaussian de Finetti
reduction [11]. Here we apply to CV MDI QKD and improve
the proof techniques of Ref. [10]:
(1) We present a simpler analysis of parameter estimation
that holds under general coherent attacks. Our analysis exploits
the recently proven optimality of Gaussian attacks in the finite-
size scenario [11] to simplify parameter estimation.
(2) We show that in CV MDI protocols the parameter
estimation routine can be performed locally by the legitimate
users with almost no public communication.
(3) We improve the secret-key rate estimates of Ref. [10]
by exploiting a different entropic inequality.
The paper develops as follows. We start in Sec. II by
reviewing the CV MDI QKD protocol of Ref. [6]. Section III
is devoted to our results about parameter estimation and its sta-
tistical analysis. In Sec. IV we present an improved estimation
of the secret-key rate obtained by applying a new entropic
inequality. A comparison with previous works is presented
in Sec. V. To make our results more concrete, numerical
examples are presented in Sec. VI. We finally discuss the
relation between security proof and experimental realization
and possible improvements in Sec. VII. Finally, conclusions
are presented in Sec. VIII.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROTOCOL
In this section, we review the CV MDI QKD protocol
introduced in Ref. [6]. The protocol develops in five steps (see
Fig. 1):
(1) Coherent states preparation. Alice and Bob locally
prepare 2n coherent states, whose complex amplitudes α′ =
(q ′A + ip′A)/2 and β ′ = (q ′B + ip′B)/2 are drawn independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) from circular symmetric,
zero-mean Gaussian distributions with variance V AM and V
B
M ,
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FIG. 1. The scheme of the CV MDI QKD protocol as described
in detail in Sec. II. Single lines represent bosonic modes, double lines
classical variables. Time evolves from left to right. Alice and Bob
initially prepare coherent states by applying displacement operators
DA, DB to the vacuum state |0〉, according to the value of their local
classical variables. The coherent states are collected by the relay that,
through some (unknown) physical transformation, outputs a classical
variable Z and gives to Eve quantum side information. Finally, Alice
and Bob apply classical displacement dA, dB , conditioned on the value
of Z, to their local classical variables.
respectively [17]. The initial random variables of Alice and
Bob are respectively denoted as X′ = (q ′A,p′A), Y ′ = (q ′B ,p′B).
(2) Operations of the relay. The 2n coherent states are sent
to the relay. For each pair of coherent states received the relay
publicly announces a complex value γ = (qZ + ipZ)/2.
(3) Parameter estimation. Alice and Bob estimate the co-







(4) Conditional displacements. Alice and Bob define the
displaced variables α = (qA + ipA)/2 and β = (qB + ipB)/2
such that
qA = q ′A − gq ′A (γ ), (1)
pA = p′A − gp′A (γ ), (2)
qB = q ′B − gq ′B (γ ), (3)
pB = p′B − gp′B (γ ), (4)
where g⋆, for each ⋆ = q ′A,p′A,q ′B ,p′B , is an affine function of
γ . As shown in Ref. [19], the optimal choice is to define the
functions as




























We remark that the parameters u⋆, v⋆ can be computed directly
from the estimated CM.
(5) Classical postprocessing. The variables X = (qA,pA),
Y = (qB,pB) represent the local raw keys of Alice and Bob,
respectively. To conclude the protocol, the raw keys X, Y are
postprocessed for error correction and privacy amplification.
We assume without loss of generality that error reconciliation
is on Alice’s raw key.
The CV MDI QKD protocol described above has two
main characteristic features. The first is that Alice and Bob
do not apply any measurement, as the only measurement
is performed by the untrusted relay. This property defines
the protocol as MDI [5,6]. The second feature is that the
correlations between Alice and Bob are generated through the
variable Z announced by the relay. As explained in detail in
Ref. [19], this property allows Alice and Bob to do parameter
estimation with a negligible amount of public communication
[21]. Therefore, they can exploit the whole raw key for both
parameter estimation and secret-key extraction.
Finally we remark that, although the variables X and Y have
in principle infinite cardinality, in practice they are always
specified by a finite number of digits. Furthermore, for the
finite-size analysis of the protocol (as well as for other practical
issues), one needs to map the unbounded and continuous
variables X, Y to some discrete and bounded variables X̄,
Ȳ . The mappings X → X̄, Y → Ȳ can be realized by an
analog-to-digital conversion (ADC) algorithm. We therefore
assume that X̄ and Ȳ are discrete variables with cardinality
22d (i.e., d bits per quadrature).
III. PARAMETER ESTIMATION
In this section we discuss how Alice and Bob can estimate
the CM of the variables (qA,pA,qB ,pB). Without loss of
generality we can assume that these variables have zero mean





















































Clearly, the entries on the principal diagonal of (8) can be
estimated locally by either Alice or Bob. It remains to estimate
the off-diagonal term z. This can be done in three different
ways:
(1) The traditional way is that Alice and Bob exchange
part of the data via a public channel to estimate the correlation
terms 〈qAqB〉 and 〈pApB〉. Clearly, in order to do so they have
to disclose part of the raw key, thus reducing the final secret-
key rate. Suppose that, over a total of n signals exchanged,
Alice and Bob usem < n signals for parameter estimation, thus
allowing an error in the estimation of the order of m−1/2. Then
only the remaining n − m < n signals are available for secret-
key extraction (i.e., error correction and privacy amplification).
(2) As noted in Ref. [10] (see also Ref. [22]) a rough
estimate of the signal-to-noise ratio is sufficient for Alice
and Bob to run the error correction routine before performing
052327-2
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parameter estimation. Then, a verification step is done to ensure
that the initial estimate was accurate enough. In this way
Alice and Bob can exploit virtually all the raw data for key
generation.
(3) For our MDI protocol Alice and Bob can exploit the
relations (see Sec. II)
qA = q ′A − uq ′AqZ − vq ′ApZ, (12)
pA = p′A − up′AqZ − vp′ApZ, (13)
qB = q ′B − uq ′B qZ − vq ′B pZ, (14)




































+ vq ′Auq ′B + up′Avp′B + vp′Aup′B
)
. (19)
Since the variances 〈qZ〉, 〈pZ〉 and the covariance 〈qZpZ〉
can be locally computed by the users, then this implies that
Alice and Bob can do parameter estimation without publicly
announcing their local data [21]. In conclusion, in this way
Alice and Bob can exploit all their raw data for both parameter
estimation and secret-key extraction.
Here we follow the latter approach because, in contrast
with the first approach and in analogy with the second one,
it requires only a constant (and hence negligible) amount
of public communication. Furthermore, the third approach
exploits the very structure of the MDI protocol and therefore
appears to be the most natural in this context.
Statistical analysis of parameter estimation
We are then left with the problem of estimating the con-
fidence interval associated with the statistical estimation of
the CM of (qA,pA,qB ,pB). It is worth stressing that this
is a remarkably complex problem in the case of general
collective attacks (see Ref. [10]). By contrast, this task becomes
straightforward under the assumption of collective Gaussian
attacks. Unlike other authors [23–25], our analysis of parame-
ter estimation under collective Gaussian attacks does not rely
on the central limit theorem and is therefore mathematically
rigorous in the finite-size setting (see instead Refs. [26,27] for
a statistical analysis of parameter estimation in CV MDI QKD
that exploits the central limit theorem).







B,qZ,pZ) are Gaussian variables. This assump-
tion comes with no loss of generality because






B) are Gaussian by definition
of the protocol.
(ii) The optimality of Gaussian attacks in the finite-size
scenario was established in Ref. [11]. This implies that the
variables (qA,pA,qB ,pB) can be assumed to be Gaussian
without loss of generality.
(iii) In principle, the variables (qZ,pZ) are not necessarily
Gaussian. Notwithstanding, by inverting Eqs. (12)–(15) we can







B). Since the latter are assumed to be Gaussian,
and since a linear combination of Gaussian variables is also
Gaussian, it follows that (qZ,pZ) are Gaussian variables too.
First consider the estimation of, say, 〈q2Z〉, whose estimator




Zj . Given that qZj are
i.i.d. Gaussian variables [28], then the empirical variance
is distributed (up to rescaling) according to a χ -squared
distribution. Therefore, a confidence interval can be readily
obtained applying the cumulative distribution function of the
χ -squared distribution, or tail bounds for it.
Second, consider the estimation of the correlation 〈qZpZ〉.
We apply the identity
〈qZpZ〉 = 14 〈(qZ + pZ)
2〉 − 1
4



















(qZj − pZj )2
(21)
is distributed as the sum of χ -squared variables. Therefore, for
each χ -squared variable, we can compute a confidence interval
and then obtain a confidence interval for the quantities x, y,
and z in Eq. (8) by error propagation.
An explicit calculation of the confidence intervals is pre-
sented in Appendix C.
IV. IMPROVED RATE ESTIMATION
The security proof against collective or Gaussian attacks
can be obtained along the lines of Ref. [10]. Here we present
an improved estimation of the conditional smooth min-entropy
obtained by applying a new entropic inequality.
We assume without loss of generality that the reconciliation
is on Bob’s variable Ȳ . The number of (approximately) secret
bits that can be extracted from the raw key is lower bounded
by the smooth min-entropy of Ȳ , conditioned on the quantum





′Z)ρn − leakEC(n,ǫEC) + 2 log (2ǫ),
(22)
where we have also subtracted the information leakage
leakEC(n,ǫEC) due to error correction (EC). The security
parameter ǫ + ǫs + ǫEC comprises three terms: ǫ comes from
the leftover hash lemma, ǫs is the smoothing parameter entering
the smooth conditional min-entropy, and ǫEC is the error in the
error-correction routine. Since conditioning does not increase








min(Ȳ |E)ρn , (23)
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min(Ȳ |E)ρn − leakEC(n,ǫEC) + 2 log (2ǫ).
(24)
A crucial point of the security proof is the estimation of
the conditional smooth min-entropy H
ǫs
min(Ȳ |E)ρn . Here we
present an approach that yields a bound on the min-entropy
that is tighter than the one of Ref. [10]. For collective (or
collective Gaussian) attacks, the state ρn is a tensor power;
i.e., ρn = ρ⊗n. On the other hand, the state that is actually
used for key generation is the one conditioned upon error
correction being successful. Because error correction has a
nonzero failure probability, the conditional state is no longer
guaranteed to be a tensor power. Indeed, the conditioned state
has the form
τ n = p−1ρ⊗n, (25)
where  is a projector operator (projecting on the subspace in
which error correction does not abort), and p = Tr(ρ⊗n)
is the probability of successful error correction. Let us recall
that the security parameter ǫ can be interpreted as the probabil-
ity that the protocol is not secure (see Appendix A for a review).
Therefore, the probability that the protocol is not secure, given
that it does not abort, cannot be larger than ǫ/p. This suggests
a relation of the form
H ǫmin(Ȳ |E)τ n ≃ H
pǫ
min(Ȳ |E)ρ⊗n . (26)
The following theorem holds:
Theorem 1. Given two n-qudit states τ n and ρ⊗n such
that τ n = p−1ρ⊗n for some projector operator  and
p = Tr(ρ⊗n), then












The proof is presented in Appendix B.
Theorem 1 implies that the state can still be assumed to be
a tensor power upon replacing ǫ → 2
3
pǫ and shortening the



















+ 2 log (2ǫ). (28)
The conditional smooth min-entropy of the tensor-power
state ρ⊗n can be estimated using the asymptotic equipartition
property (AEP), which yields a bound in terms of the von
Neumann conditional entropy [30]:




AEP(δ,d)  4(d + 1)
√
log (2/δ2) (29)
is also a function of the dimensionality parameter d.
The next step in the security proof is to estimate the
conditional entropy
H (Ȳ |E)ρ = H (Ȳ )ρ − I (Ȳ ; E)ρ . (30)
Let us first consider the estimation of the mutual information
I (Ȳ ; E)ρ . We remark that the latter is upper bounded by
the mutual information with the variable Y , i.e., I (Ȳ ; E)ρ 
I (Y ; E)ρ , since the ADC algorithm cannot increase the mutual
information. In turn, the property of extremality of Gaus-
sian states [31,32] allows us to write the bound I (Y ; E)ρ 
I (Y ; E)ρG ≡ IBE , where ρG is a Gaussian state with same CM
as ρ.
To conclude, we notice that the quantity nH (Ȳ ) −
leakEC(n,ǫEC) is the number of (not necessarily secret) bits
of common information shared by Alice and Bob after the
error-correction routine. Ideally, in the limit of large block size,
ADC with arbitrarily large precision, and perfect operations,
this quantity is expected to be equal to nI (X; Y )ρ , where
I (X; Y ) is the mutual information between Alice and Bob.
Therefore, we can put
H (Ȳ ) −
1
n
leakEC(n,ǫEC) = βI (X; Y )ρ, (31)
where the efficiency parameter β ∈ (0,1) accounts for all
the sources of nonideality in the protocol. The inequality
βI (X; Y )ρ  βI (X; Y )ρG ≡ βIAB , where ρG is the Gaussian
state with same first and second moments, follows from
Ref. [32]. Notice that β is also a function of n and ǫEC.
In conclusion, the results presented in this section, com-
bined with the security proof of Ref. [10], yield the following




























2 log (2ǫ), (33)
where ÎAB and ÎBE are the empirical estimates for the mutual
informations, and ǫPE is the probability of error in parameter
estimation.
V. COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS SECURITY PROOF
Our expression for the rate in Eq. (33) can be compared
to the analogous expression given in Theorem 1 of Ref. [10].
The first difference between the two expressions is in the term
proportional to AEP (that is the leading correction term in our
finite-size analysis), which in Ref. [10] is replaced by [33]

(1)
AEP = (d + 1)















It is clear that 
(1)
AEP > AEP, where for small values of p and
ǫ the difference is dominated by the term 2 log 2
p2ǫ
. We empha-
size that the fact that with our approach we obtain a smaller
finite-size correction AEP follows from the application of the
min-entropy inequality of Theorem 1.
The expression for the rate in Ref. [10] also includes
an additional error term ent, scaling as n
−1/2 log n. In our
formulation this term does not appear and has been somehow
incorporated in the efficiency factor β. We believe that our
approach provides a better way to model what is done in
experimental implementations of the protocol. We remark that
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CONTINUOUS-VARIABLE MEASUREMENT-DEVICE- … PHYSICAL REVIEW A 97, 052327 (2018)
FIG. 2. As an example, in Sec. VI we consider the case of
independent entangling cloner attacks on the two communication
lines, where τA and τB are the beam-splitter transmissivities. The
attacks also introduce independent excess noises of variances ξA =
(1 − τA)(ωA − 1), ξB = (1 − τB )(ωB − 1). The relay applies Bell
detection on the incoming modes, whose result defines the variable
Z and is publicly announced.
ent is the leading finite-size correction term in the analysis of
Ref. [10].
Finally, we exploit the Gaussian assumption to compute the
confidence intervals for parameter estimation. The result (see
Appendix C) is that the elements of the CM can be estimated





with a given overall probability of error smaller than ǫPR. This
result is comparable with that of Ref. [10]: the reason is that,
although Ref. [10] considers general collective attacks, the
analysis of the parameter estimation is effectively reduced to
the Gaussian setting by applying a randomization technique.
Although we obtain finite-size corrections related to parameter
estimation that are quantitatively similar to Ref. [10], our
statistical analysis is much simpler. This is due to the fact that
we exploit the assumption of a Gaussian attack which has been
proven to come without loss of generality even in the finite-size
setting [11].
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
The expression in Eq. (33), together with the parameter
estimation analysis of Sec. III, allows us to compute the
estimated secret key directly from experimental data for any
Gaussian attack (and then extend to general attacks using the
results of Ref. [11]). In this section, as an example, we compute
the rate as a function of loss and block size for the case of an
entangling cloner attack (depicted in Fig. 2). We consider two
settings: (1) symmetric attacks in which both communication
lines from Alice to the relay and from Bob to the relay are
wiretapped with a beam splitter with equal transmissivity
τA = τB = τ , and (2) asymmetric attacks where the relay is
assumed very close to Alice’s station, τA ≃ 1.
In both cases, following Ref. [6], the eavesdropper collects
all the loss from the communication lines, and the variable Z is
the outcome of a perfect Bell detection performed at the relay.
These kinds of attacks have been characterized thoroughly in
Ref. [6], where the asymptotic rate (in the limit of infinite block
size) has been computed as
r0n = βÎAB − ÎBE, (36)
where the mutual informations are bounded by the results of
parameter estimation. In our example we choose the conserva-
tive value β = 0.95 [34–37]. (Notice that in principle the factor
β is a function of n and ǫEC, but for the sake of illustration we
assume it to be constant.)
Putting 〈q ′2A 〉 = 〈p′2A 〉 = 〈q ′2B 〉 = 〈p′2B 〉 = VM , we obtain

















and the covariances of mutually conjugate quadratures vanish.















where ξA = (1 − τA)(ωA − 1), ξB = (1 − τB)(ωB − 1) are the
excess noise variances and ωA,B are the thermal noise that Eve
injects in the links, respectively (see Eq. (1) of Ref. [6]). The
only nonvanishing displacement coefficients are






























































n−1 8 ln (8/ǫPE) (see Appendix C).




























2 log (2ǫ), (48)
where ǫ′ = ǫ + ǫs + ǫEC + ǫPE. In Figs. 3 and 4 this rate
is plotted vs the block size n, for different values of the
transmissivities and excess noise for error-correction efficiency
of β = 95%. The plots are obtained putting p = 0.99, ǫ =
ǫs = ǫEC = ǫPE = 10−21, hence obtaining an overall security
parameter ǫ′ < 10−20. We also put d = 5: with this choice of
052327-5




























FIG. 3. Secret-key rate vs block size for asymmetric attacks: τA =
0.99 and different values of τB (from top to bottom the attenuation of
the communication line from Bob to the relay is of 1, 2, and 4 dB). The
excess noise is ξA = 0 and ξB = 0.01 (in shot noise units). Solid lines
are for collective Gaussian attacks, and dashed lines are for coherent
attacks. For both kinds of attack, the overall security parameter is
smaller than 10−20.
d the error in the Shannon entropy due to the ADC is less than
1%. The rate is then obtained by maximizing over the value of
modulation, VM .


































































FIG. 4. Secret-key rate vs block size for symmetric attacks and
different values of τA = τB (from top to bottom the symmetric
attenuation is of 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, and 0.55 dB). The excess noise is
ξA = ξB = 0.01 (in shot noise units). Solid lines are for collective
Gaussian attacks, and dashed lines are for coherent attacks. For both
kinds of attack, the overall security parameter is smaller than 10−20.
where k is the number of signals used for the energy test,
K ∼ n, and ǫ′′ = K4
50
ǫ′.
In Figs. 3 and 4 this rate is plotted vs the block size n for
different values of the transmissivities and excess noise, for
error-correction efficiency of β = 95%. The plots are obtained
for ǫ = ǫs = ǫEC = ǫPE chosen in such a way to obtain ǫ′′ <
10−20. The rate is then obtained by maximizing over k and the
modulation VM and for p = 0.99.
VII. DISCUSSION
In the case of coherent attacks, the major bottleneck
limiting the rate of secret bits generation per second comes
from the classical postprocessing, and in particular the active
symmetrization routine, due to the typically large size of the
data set. While it has been conjectured that such an active
symmetrization might not be actually needed [11], it remains
an open theoretical problem to find a security proof that does
not require one to perform such a computationally costly
operation.
Here we present two arguments supporting the conjecture
that the active symmetrization routine may not be actually
performed in any experimental realization of the protocol:
(1) The active symmetrization routine consists in Alice and
Bob multiplying their local raw keys by a random matrix. Since
the matrix is invertible and publicly known, such an operation
cannot by any means increase the secret-key length. Therefore,
we deduce that the same secret-key rate might be achieved even
without performing the symmetrization routine.
(2) The symmetrization routine is also instrumental for the
energy test. After the symmetrization operation, Alice and
Bob estimate the expectation value of the energy from only
a relatively small part of the raw key. We notice that Alice and
Bob can obtain an even better estimate of the mean energy
from the whole raw key. This suggests that the symmetrization
step might be avoided without affecting the energy test.
In summary, these two arguments suggest that the require-
ment of performing the symmetrization routine might be an
artifact of the particular technique used to prove the security
and therefore might not be strictly required in a practical
realization of the protocol.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a rigorous assessment of the security of
continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quan-
tum key distribution (CV MDI QKD) in the finite-size regime.
Our results are obtained by applying and modifying the results
of Ref. [10], also exploiting the Gaussian de Finetti reduction
recently introduced in Ref. [11], together with our results
on parameter estimation and a new min-entropy inequality.
Because of this improvement, our estimate on the secret-key
rate is improved with respect to results of Refs. [10,11].
In doing this, we have shown that for our MDI protocol all
the raw data can be used for both parameter estimation and
secret-key extraction. Such a unique feature is a consequence
of the fact that correlations between Alice and Bob are encoded
in the variable that is publicly announced by the relay—even
though such a variable does not contain information about
the secret key (see Ref. [19]). It might be possible that for
052327-6
CONTINUOUS-VARIABLE MEASUREMENT-DEVICE- … PHYSICAL REVIEW A 97, 052327 (2018)
the same reason the security analysis of MDI QKD can be
further simplified, in particular the energy test and active
symmetrization routines. It is worth remarking that standard
one-way protocols, in both direct and reverse reconciliation,
can be simulated by an MDI one, simply by assigning the
relay to either Alice or Bob [6]. For this reason, this unique
property of MDI QKD can be readily extended to the one-way
setting [19].
Our statistical analysis of parameter estimation is fully
composable and does not rely on the central limit theorem
(and therefore is mathematically rigorous in the finite-size
setting). Notwithstanding, we do not expect that our approach
gives tight bounds on the statistical error induced by parameter
estimation. In fact, tighter bounds may be obtained following
a different approach, for example, by invoking the central limit
theorem as in Refs. [26,27].
We have shown that it is in principle possible to generate
a secret key against the most general class of coherent attacks
for block sizes of the order of 107–109, depending on loss
and noise, and on the required level of security. Therefore, our
results indicate that a field demonstration of CV MDI QKD
might be feasible with currently available technologies. In
particular, our composable security analysis confirms that CV
MDI protocols allow for high QKD rates on the metropolitan
scale, thus confirming the results of the asymptotic analysis
first discussed in Ref. [6].
Note added. After the completion of this work, other authors
have independently presented a security analysis of CV MDI
QKD obtained by exploiting entropic uncertainty relations
[38]. Although directly applicable to obtain security against
coherent attacks, this approach is known to provide bounds on
the secret-key rate that in general are not tight.
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APPENDIX A: OPERATIONAL INTERPRETATION
OF THE SECURITY PARAMETER
Ideally, in QKD one would like to obtain a shared key that
is truly random and secret to the eavesdropper. The final state
of a protocol that successfully distributes s perfectly secret bits





|x〉A〈x| ⊗ |x〉B〈x| ⊗ σE . (A1)
In reality, one can only hope to get as close as possible to such
an ideal scenario. Let ρ denote the final state of a given QKD
protocol. The extent to which the state ρ approximates the ideal
one ρ0 is often quantified in terms of the trace distance:
D(ρ,ρ0) = 12‖ρ − ρ0‖1 =
1
2
Tr|ρ − ρ0| . (A2)
The trace distance has several desirable properties for a good
security quantifier [29,39,40]. In particular, here we discuss its
interpretation in terms of the probability that the generated
key is secret. It is well known that the operational meaning
of the trace distance is related to the problem of quantum
state discrimination [41]. Suppose one is given a black box
containing either ρ or ρ0, each with probability 1/2. Then
any measurement strategy, compatible with the principles of
quantum mechanics, allows one to distinguish between the two





Let us define a binary random variable U with probability
distribution PU = (pe,1 − pe). As a matter of fact U character-
izes the distinguishability of the states ρ andρ0, that is, between
the output of the given QKD protocol and an ideal, perfectly
secure one. For example, if the state happens to coincide with
the ideal one, we have PU = Psec = (1/2,1/2). On the other
hand, if the state can be perfectly distinguished from the ideal
one, PU = Pinsec = (0,1).









= (1 − ǫ)Psec + ǫPinsec. (A4)
Therefore, the probability distribution of the variable U char-
acterizing the output of the QKD protocol is the convex sum
of the probability distribution Psec associated to the ideal
output state and the probability Pinsec associated to a state
that can be perfectly distinguished from the ideal one. In
conclusion, such a convex sum decomposition of PU allows us
to interpret 1 − ǫ as the probability that the output of the QKD
protocol is indistinguishable from the ideal one, and thus for
all practical purposes is itself perfectly secure. In other words,
the probability that the output of the protocol is not perfectly
secure is smaller than ǫ. Assuming the worst-case scenario,
below we put ǫ equal to the probability that the key is not
secret.
Taking abstraction on the state and focusing on the protocol
itself, this same reasoning is extended to the direct comparison
of two protocols E and E0, formally represented as completely
positive maps, via the diamond norm
‖E − E0‖⋄ = sup
σ
‖(E ⊗ I − E0 ⊗ I )σ‖1, (A5)
where the supremum is over all input states and the maps are
extended to include an ancillary system.
APPENDIX B: SOME PROPERTIES OF
SMOOTH ENTROPY
One of the main tools for quantifying the security of
QKD is the conditional smooth min-entropy. In this Appendix
we review some of the main definitions and properties (see
Refs. [29,30] for the proofs) and derive a useful inequality in
Proposition 6 that is applied for our security proof.
Definition 2: Conditional min-entropy. The min-entropy of
A conditioned on B of the bipartite state ρAB is
Hmin(A|B)ρ := max
σ
sup{λ : ρAB  2−λIA ⊗ σB}, (B1)
where I is the identity operator and σ is a subnormalized state.
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Here we are interested in the conditional min-entropy
of classical-quantum (CQ) states of the form ρXB =
∑
x∈X P (x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ω(x). In this case the conditional min-







where E is a quantum channel.
The following holds:
Lemma 1. Let ρ =
∑
x∈X P (x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ω(x) be a CQ state
and S a subset of X . We define the projector operator  =
∑
x∈S |x〉〈x|, and the state p−1ρ, with p = Tr(ρ). The
following inequality holds:
Hmin(X|B)p−1ρ  Hmin(X|B)ρ + log p. (B3)
Proof. By applying the characterization of the min-entropy












= 2−Hmin(X|B)ρ−log p. (B7)

The smooth conditional min-entropy of ρ is defined as the
maximum min-entropy in a neighborhood of ρ:
Definition 3: Smooth conditional min-entropy. The smooth
conditional min-entropy of A conditioned on B of the state
ρAB is
H ǫmin(A|B)ρ := max
ρ̃
Hmin(A|B)ρ̃, (B8)
where ρ̃ is a “smoothing state” such that D(ρ̃,ρ)  ǫ, with
D(ρ̃,ρ) denoting the trace distance.
Remark 4. Here we have defined the entropy smoothing
using the trace distance as in Ref. [29] instead of the purified
distance as done in Ref. [30].
Remark 5. For a CQ state ρ it is sufficient to consider
smoothing states that are classical on the same support as ρ
[30]. Therefore, there exists a CQ state ρ⋆ such that D(ρ⋆,ρ) 
ǫ and
H ǫmin(X|B)ρ = Hmin(X|B)ρ⋆ . (B9)
Lemma 2. Let us consider two CQ states ρ =
∑
x∈X P (x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ω(x) and ρ⋆ =
∑
x∈X P⋆(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗
ω⋆(x) such that D(ρ,ρ⋆)  ǫ, and a projector operator
 =
∑




where p = Tr(ρ) =
∑
x∈S P (x) and p⋆ = Tr(ρ⋆) =
∑
x∈S P⋆(x).






and that D(ρ,ρ⋆)  ǫ implies







































where in the first inequality we have applied the triangular
inequality and in the last one we have applied Eqs. (B10) and
(B11). 
We are now ready to present a “smoothed” version of
Lemma 1:
Proposition 6. Let ρ =
∑
x∈X P (x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ω(x) be a CQ
state and S a subset of X . We define the projector  =
∑
x∈S |x〉〈x|, and the (normalized) state τ = p−1ρ, where
p = Tr(ρ). The following inequality relates the condi-
tional smooth min-entropies of ρ and τ :

















Lemma 2 implies that D(p−1ρ,p−1⋆ ρ⋆)  ǫ. We then
upper-bound the conditional smooth min-entropy of τ =
p−1ρ as follows:
H ǫmin(X|B)p−1ρ  Hmin(X|B)p−1⋆ ρ⋆ (B19)
 Hmin(X|B)ρ⋆ + log p⋆ (B20)
= H ǫ′min(X|B)ρ + log p⋆ (B21)
 H ǫ
′
min(X|B)ρ + log (p − ǫ
′), (B22)
where in the first inequality we have applied the fact that
p−1⋆ ρ⋆ is ǫ-close to p
−1ρ, in the second inequality we
have applied Lemma 1, the first equality is obtained choosing a
ρ⋆ that verifies Eq. (B9) with ǫ
′ = 2
3
pǫ, and the last inequality
is obtained from Eq. (B11). 
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1. Dealing with the nonzero probability that the protocol aborts
The assumption that the state ρ⊗n is a tensor product is
justified for collective attacks. However, since error correction
has a nonzero probability of aborting, one should consider
the conditional probability of obtaining a secret key given the
protocol did not abort. Unfortunately, the state conditioned on
the protocol not aborting is no longer guaranteed to have a
tensor product structure.
The state ρ⊗n, which describes the correlations between




P (xn,yn)|xn〉〈xn| ⊗ |yn〉〈yn| ⊗ ωE(xnyn),
(B23)
where P (xn,yn) is the probability of a sequence of symbols
xn,yn and ωE(x
nyn) is the corresponding conditional state of
Eve. The protocol does not abort only on a given subsetS of the
sequences xnyn; therefore, the state for a nonaborting protocol
reads
τ n = p−1ρ⊗n, (B24)
where  =
∑
xnyn∈S |xn〉〈xn| ⊗ |yn〉〈yn| is a projector opera-
tor, and p = Tr(ρ⊗n) is the normalization factor.
Proposition 6 yields a simple relation between the condi-
tional smooth min-entropies of ρ⊗n and τ n, namely,












where p is interpreted as the probability that the protocol does
not abort.
APPENDIX C: TAIL BOUNDS
The cumulative distribution function of the χ -squared vari-
able χ2(k) with k degrees of freedom is F (x; k) = Ŵ[k/2,x/2]
Ŵ[k/2]
,
where Ŵ[k/2] is the Euler gamma function, and Ŵ[k/2,x/2] is
the lower incomplete gamma function.
To bound the cumulative distribution function we can use,

















(These bounds are derived from the Chernoff bound using



































together with similar bounds for the quantities 〈p2Z〉, 〈q2A〉,

















〈(qZ + pZ)2〉 >
n−1
∑





〈(qZ − pZ)2〉 <
n−1
∑






















Pr {x > xmax}  2e−nt
2/8, Pr {y > ymax}  2e−nt

























































where w1, w2, and w3 are defined in Eqs. (17)–(19).
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Pr {x > xmax ∨ y > ymax ∨ z < zmin}  ǫPE. (C11)
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